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SERBIA AND Kosovo: A RESOLUTION FOR
BOTH SIDES
Arielle Badger
INTRODUCTION
"Balkanization, " a term co ined for th e dissolu tion of the Former Yu goslavia, w as a
me ssy and violent process. Bo rd ers we re drawn accord ing to historical rights to terri tory,
many times disregarding the ethnicities th at in habited that land . Therefor e, man y pockets of
land wi th a high e th nic co ncent ration we re integrated into cou ntries w ith a di ffer ing ethnic
maj o rity . E ven prior to the d issol uti on of th e Fonner Yu goslavia, boundaries within th e
regi on have always been a sou rce of viol ent cont ent ion am on g the vario us ethnicities living
in the region . Afte r th e Yu goslav wa rs of th e 1990s, new borders were d rawn in th e Bal kans.
O ne of th e m ost con te ntious of th ese bor ders was that of Koso vo as an autonomous regi on
within Serbia. After NATO's illegal intervention in 1999 , Kosovo was established as a UN
prot ecto rate and left in sta tus limb o until it de clared in depende nce in 2008. This has cau sed
serio us co nflict bet ween not o nly Se rbia and Kosovo , hut with in th e ent ire inte rna tiona l
conuuuniry.
The "West" want s th e m essy state of the Bal kan s to be cleaned up . The W est perceives
Koso vo 's inde penden ce to be th e o nly so lution . Ser bia will neve r recogni ze th e inde pen-
dence of K050 VO. The histo ry of Kosovo and Se rbia began o ver 600 years ago; ho we ver, th e
W est only sees M ilosevic's atrociti es in th e 1980s-1 990s. What mu st he und erstood is th at
both sides of thi s co nflict, th e Koso vars and th e Se rbs, both have blood on th eir hands. T h e
confl ict is not one sided - both parties have been victims to horro rs fro m th e o the r; both
sides share guilt . Thus, com prom ises and con cessions must be made on botl, side s.
It is o f vital importan ce for th e W est that th e Koso vo status qu estio n be resolved as
qui ckl y, and cleanly as possibl e . H owever, the W est is pursuing th e Ko sovo statu s qu estion
with their own agenda , ignoring the concerns of th e Serbs. Thus [;lr, all negot iations since
Koso vos creation III 1999 hav e failed , large ly du e to the lack of concessions from the W est.
This paper proposes th at in orde r to persuad e Ser bia to recognize Kosovo, new nego-
tiati o ns must be made. The W est should co nsider red rawi ng Kos ovo 's boundaries to kee p
th e area no rth of th e river Iba r <IS Se rbia, and also to continue offering EU M embersh ip to
Serbia. Thro ugh th ese two co nc essions per haps Se rbia co uld he persuaded to recognize an
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indep endent Kosovo .
This p~per will first explo re the com ple x history of Koso vo and Serbia from its ori gin s
ill 13W) until the present day . Then it w ill pr oce ed to investigat e th e co nce rns of th e Se rbs
in regards to th e valid ity and legality of K oso vos indepe ndence . T he qu estion able legality
o f K osovos declarati on of Ind epend en ce makes it ne cessary for other co nside rations to be
m ade for Serbia in hopes of ato ning for potential vio lation of Serbia 's sovereignty. Lastly,
it w ill pre sent alte rn ative solutions to reso lving th e statu s que stion , namely th e partiti on of
Kosovo and M etohija , and exp editing th e EU acc ession pr ocess for Serbi a.
HISTORY OF SERBIA AND Kosovo
T he m ost influential and defining m oment o f Se rbian history in Kosovo w as the Batt le
of Koso vo o n June 28 , 1389 w he n th e Ottoman T ur ks in vad ed the province . Prince Lazar
of Serb ia led O rthodox Christi ans to fight th e inv adin g Muslims. Althou gh it was a milita ry
defeat for the Ser bs, it w as a spi ritual and cultural victo ry: Lazar was a Se rbian her o and died
as a m art yr for th e O rt hodox [ lith. D efeat uni ted th e Serbs religiously and politically, giVIng
rise to Ser bian nationalism (D uijzings 2000). T his territory is where Serbia's history , heri-
tage, tradition and national identi ty began and is still revered as th e birthplace o f th e Serbian
nation . In fact , Slob cdan Mil osevic in D ecember of 1995 proclaim ed Kosovo as " the heart
of Se rbia." For every Se rb , "Kosovo is a holy [land] .... There were 200,000 Serbs living
111 Kosovo mu ch befo re Albanians ever came from th e ro cky [Balkan] m ountain s" (Ph illips
1996, 823) . Kosovo Da y is still celebrated in Serbia every June IH in co m m em o rario n of
th e battl e . Follo wing th e Battle of Kosov o , O tto man Turks 1II0 ved into th e terri tory and
introdu ced IsLIIII to the culture. Kosovar Alb ani ans converted into Islam and became the
ruling class, and as such suppressed th e Orthodox Serbians for alm ost 600 years u ntil th e fall
of th e Ottoman Empire in W orld W ar I.
T h e assassina tio n of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Au stria in Sarajevo by tlie Serbian
gro up tlie "Black Ha nd" in 1914 was th e- immediate spark that starte d World War I. This
political shoot in g wa s an attem pt by the south-Slavic re- gion to gain inde-pendence from th e
Austri a-Hungarian Empi re to create- a " G re-ate r Se rbia." For th e durati on of W orld Wa r I,
Au stria occ upie-d Se rb ia, fig h ting several devastating battl es. Au strian plant'S bombe-d civil-
ian refu gees and so ldie rs indi scriminately-a quarter of a million Serbs were killed, 15% of
Serbi a's overall population.
In th e interim be-tw een W orld W ar [ and Wo rld War 11 , Serbia and Kosovo were in-
tegrated into th e Kingd om of Yugoslavia, which enco m passed th e Western Balka n re-gio n .
In 1941 , th e Axis Powers invad ed and occupied th e Kingdom of Yugoslavia, with Italy
instating a fascist, C roatian gove rnm ent. The Albanian Kosovars also side d wi th th e Italians
and Axis Pow ers and persecuted Serbs with in its boundaries. The Serbs side d w ith th e- Al-
lied po wers, and co nseque ntly 500,000 Serbians w ere killed by the C ro ati an regim e. The-
Serbian O rt hodox Church was also deva stat ed; 217 Orthodox prie sts w ere killed.
After World W ar II, th e Kingdom of Yu gosla via wa s liberated by th e Alli ed Powers
ri nd becam e th e Federal R epubli c of Yu goslavia, ru led by th e iron fist of J osip B roz Tiro .
This new cou ntry was com posed of what are now Sloveni a, C roatia, Ma ced onia, Bosnia
and Herzeg ovin a, Serbi a, and M ontene-gro. ln 1974. Tiro's Yu gosla via rati fied a n ew co n-
stitu tion makin g it a fed eration of six republ ics with Kosovo and Voj vo dina ,IS auto no mous
region s withi n Serbia (Vidmar 2009). Kosovo was given an equal vo t e in nati onal govern-
m ental bodi es; how ever, it was not distinguished as a " nation" 111 the co nstitution (R ogel
2003). Koso vo and Vojvodiua were not" nations" as Serbi a, Croatia , Slo venia , M aced oni a,http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/3
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M ontenegro and Bosnia we re. Rathe r, th e- regions w e- re co m prised of "nati onalities" w ith in
a "nation " (Serbia) . The term " natio n" app lied to th e " peo ple- att ached to a ce rtain rep ub-
lie," w hile " na tio na lity" applied to th e " people atta che d to on e of th e two au to nomous
pro vin ces" (Vidmar 20 0li) . The 1974 co nstitu tion of Y ugo slavia m ade it so that o nly n;l-
tions we re e ntitled to th e right of self-dete rm inario n and success ion (Vid mar 2009). Koso vo
remained an au to nomo us region withi n the " natio n" of Se rbia. T he Koso vars were un sntis-
fied with thi s poli tical arrangement and protested for recogni tion as ;) " natio n" and th us an
in dep enden t repu blic wi th in Y ugoslavia.
In 19S1i, Slobodan M ilosevic was elec ted president of Y ugoslavia . As president, Mi-
lose-vic am end ed th e co nstitu tio n to essentially strip Albanians of th eir co nstitutio nal rights
and to take autonomy away fro m Kosovo and Vojvodina. These two reg ions becam e- sub-
ordinate to Serbian aut ho rities and no longer enjoyed their former auton o m y. T his also
created strict segregati o n polici es imposed by the Serbs, increasin g th e te nsio n between th e
Kosovars and Se rbs (W hee le r 2000). In 19S9, the Democrati c Leagu e of Koso vo (LD K)
organized to peacefull y protest th e mi streatment of Koso vars 111 Serbia . Led by Ibrahim
Rugova, th e LDK worked th rou gh no n- vio lent m ean s to wards all independent Koso vo . As
Slo ven ia and Croa t ia sece de d fr o ru Y ugoslavia HI 1li91, th e LDK decla red ind ep endence fo r
Kosovo ;) S we ll (R oge l 20OJ) .
Aft er th e co llapse o f th e So viet U nio n. Yu goslavia was brok e apa rt as " natio ns" se-
cede d from Y ugo slav ia to become separ.ue, independent states . In an atte m pt to conta in
o rde r during thi s pro cess, th e Eu ro pean C o nu nuniry M embers in l li9 I created the Arb it ra-
tion Conuni ssio n of th e In rernational C onfere nce for Peace in Yu goslavia, also know n as
th e Badi nrer Com m issio n. This was to add ress the legal qu estions of th e d isso lution of Y u-
go slavia. The Eu rop ean Con u nun iry estab lished set criteria to recogni ze the indep end ence
of an y breaka wa y Yu goslav R epublics. T he Badinter Commission was to evaluate each
potential stat e on th ese crite ria (Vid m ar 20(9) . The Badinter Commission rul ed to uphold
th e principle of uti possidetis juris: w hen a territory gains independen ce. ne w in terna tio na l
boundaries should onl y be dr aw n wh ere th ere previously existed intern al ad mini strative
boundaries at th e tim e of independen ce (Wa tso n 200S). Thus th e histori cal borde rs rema in
the i nternationally recognized o nes .
Slo ven ia and Croatia both sece de d first; ho wever , th e president of Yugoslavia , M ilo so-
vic did not suppo rt th e di sso luti on of Yu goslavia. M iloso vic attem pted to reunit e the six
" natio ns" in th e region . causing the o utb reak of th e Yu goslav W ars in l lJ92. Bosn ians, C ro -
ats, and Ser bs eng .rgcd in ethnic cleansing and atrocit ies aga inst th e Muslim s in the region
fo r four years. In fact, th e o ffic ial term "ethn ic cleansing " o rigina ted in th e Bosni an W ar.
Although th ere we re EU and UN peacek eepers o n th e gro und in Bosnia, N AT O and Inan y
W estern co u ntries d id no t e ngage unt il l lilJ5 (R o berts 1( 99) . R ath er . th e in terna tio na l
co m m unity £liled to in ter ven e because they were hes itant to ente r and vio late the regi o n 's
righ t to sove reign ty in an in tri nsic civil war.
Following NATO 's in ter vent ion against Bosni an-Serb forces in sp ring of 1995 , the
D ayton Peace Ac cords end ed th e B osni an W ar. Yet, this peace treaty failed to pro vide
protection for the Albanian mino ri ty in Serbia. Rugova and the LDK wer e largely ign ored
at the peace talks. The UN did warn Belgrad e th at sanctio ns would continu e until Serbia
started to "deal positively and directly w ith th e Kosovars" (Rogel 2003) .
Being as non-violent, polit ical mea ns failed to gam indep endence for Koso vo, in 19l)()
th e Kosovo Liberation Ann)' (KLA) was formed to ope nly o ppose Se rbian rul e . T his grou p
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em ploy ed guerilla tacti cs, with svster n atic bo m bing and terrori st actions agalllSt th e Y ugo-
S I~I V l~lI l go ven llne n t. The K LA assassinated Se rb offi cials throu gh out 1997 and J998 (Rogel
2003) . The Se rb gove rn m e nt cracked do wn on th e Kosovars in response to th e militant
!<.LA. T he UN co ndem ned the viole nce on both sides of th e co nflict , parti cul arly th e "a ct s
of terrori sm" co nd ucted hy the KLA . Vio le nce escalated as !<.LA offe nsives gr ew larger and
bolder and in March o f 1998, th e Se rbian Y ugosla v army began retaliating nulitarilv aga inst
the !<.LA .
In the fall o f 1998, th e Serbian gove rn me nt , led by Pr esident Mil osevic, began a new
campaign o f e thnic clean sing in Kosovo (W heele r 2000) . In wha t becam e to he kno wn as
the " O cto ber Agreemen ts," th e U N Security Council tri ed to rec tify this pr obl em . H o w ev-
er, Russia refu sed to inte rvene militarily to sto p th e ethnic clean sing in Ko so vo . D ur in g thi s
time of disagreemen t and lack of act ion, M ilose vic escalated h is att acks against th e Kosov ars
and KLA . Fin ally, after th e breakdo wn of d iplo mati c talk s, N ATO decided to tak e act ion
on beh alf of th e Kosova rs and KiA. Air strikes agai nst Serbia began on M arch 25, ] 999 and
co ntinued fo r 1] weeks . H o w ever, this actio n was taken w it ho u t expli ci t penui ssion from
the UN (Robe rts, 19( 9). This bo m bing cam paign in Belgrade has been highl y contes ted as
illegitimate 'and against internation al law (Robe rts, 19(9). N ATO fo rces kill ed m ore th an
5,000 Yugoslav soldie rs and ove r 500 civili ans durin g th is bombin g campaign (Schw abach
2003 ). Afte r th e su rrende r o f M ilosevic, Koso vo becam e a N ATO protectorate with UN
assistan ce , but no clear roa dm ap was crea ted fo r th e future of Kosovo . The W est 's failure
to int ervene soo ner in th e Bosnian War resulted in ethnic cleansing of Muslims o n a 111d S-
sive scale and destabili zation in Eu rop e . In 1999, th is f.1i lu re was very fresh . It is argue d that
NATO gav e Kosovo p rotected auton omy as aton em ent to redee m its p rior m istake s and
lack of actio n In th e Bal kans (Rob erts, 1(99).
T he Koso vo status p ro cess unde r th e j u risd ic tio n o f th e UN began in 2005 . In 200()
internat ional negotiations start ed to determi ne th e status of Kosovo . Ma ny pa rties, parti cu -
larly th e Serbs an d Russian s, were co nce rne d with the rights and pr ot ection of the l<l rge
Serbian maj ority north of th e river Ib;IL During the] 9')9 war, vio lence was cond ucted o n
bo th part ies ; th e Koso vars by th e Ser bs an d th e Se rbs by th e Koso vars. Hundreds of Serbs
III Koso vo were killed as th ey fled th e provin ce. Furth ermore, histori cal Serbian O rthodox
churc hes and land ma rks were destroyed by Al ban ian Koso vars (R obe rts J(99). The Serbs
and Russian s were afra id of ,I repeat of vio lence against th e Serbs in northern Koso vo .
Additionally , there were sev eral concerns that inde pe ndence for Kosovo w ould create
ch aos an d igni te seve ral irre de ntist mo vem ents. There are seve ral regi o ns w ith pocke ts o f
a strong min o rity, e th nic co ncentratio n wi thi n th e Ba lkans: ma ny o f w hic h we re as dete r-
mined fo r indep endence as Kosovo . Many co un tries feared th at this w ould not o nly reignite
these irredentist m o vements withi n th e Bal ka ns , bu t throu ghout th e wo rld. D un ng th e
negoti ati ons, Se rbia wa s w illing to grant more auto no m y to Koso vo, but not ind ep enden ce .
This was fully sup po rte d by Russia and C hina. H o we ver, th e Koso vars demanded nothing
less th an inde pe nde nce .
O n M arch 26, 2007 , UN special e nvoy Martti Ahtisaari presented his " R epo rt o f the
Spec ial Envoy of the Secre tary Gene ral On Kosovo 's Future Status" to th e U N Secretary
Gener al. In hi s p ro posal, Ahtisaari made th e reco mmendatio n that Koso vo should become
independent , subject to a peri od of inte rna tio nal sup e rvisio n as gra d ua l ind ep en dence was
give n. Specifically, thi s pro posal prov ide d a set route for Kosovo to foUow for gradua l
indepen dence . The United States, alo ng with several o ther co un tries in Western Europe ,
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/3
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is h ighl y su pportive o f th e " Ahtisaa ri Plan " for Koso vo ind ep endence . T h is plan o utl ined
pr o visions for th e new Kosovo const itution, namely to ensure the rights of communities
and their member and de cen tralizat ion o f local go vcn uueut . T he J ud icia l system wa s also
ad d ressed , to e nsur e j ustice and the rul e o f law. The Se rb ian min ori ty was tak en int o gre at
co nside ratio n . Special p ro visions w ere m ade in regard s to respecting th e Se rbs' reli giou s and
cultural herita ge, imluding several Serbian Orthod ox cathedrals and nat ional landmarks in
Koso vo. Another provi sio n was made to protect th e proper ty o f citize ns as K oso vo gained
ind ep enden ce fro m Serbia (Balka n In vestigati ve R ep orting N et work 2007).
T he main prov ision in thi s plan was to im plement th e Eu rop ean Security and D efense
Poli cy's Rule of Law mis sion in Koso vo (E U LE X) . T h is wa s to slo w ly repl ace the UN Mis-
sion in Koso vo as the go vern ing internat ional bo d y in Koso vo . Man y W estern cou ntries
pledged to suppo rt th e Ahrisaari plan and saw ind ep enden ce for Koso vo as the o nly viable
o ptio n to resolvin g this status problem and bring stability to the region. (U .S Department of
State 2008). H owever, Serbi a vehemently opposed this proposition. The N ational Assem-
bly o f the R epubli c of Serbi a 's "Resolu tion foll o w ing UN Sp ecia l En vy M arui Ahtisarri 's
'C o m pre hensive Proposal for th e Kosovo Statu s Settlem en t' and co ntin ua tion of nego-
tiatio ns on the fu ture status o f Koso vo-Merohij a" stated th at , Ahtisarri Plan " b reaches the
fund amental prin ciples of international law since it d oes not take into consider ation th e so v-
ereignty and terr it orial integri ty o f th e R epu blic of Se rbia in relati on to Koso vo-Met oh ija."
Both Russia and C h ina suppo rt Serbia and threat en ed to ve to this pro po sal if it cam e to th e
Sec urity Cou ncil. T h us, th e U N ne ver app ro ved the Ahtisauri Plan. H ow ever, by th e end
of 2007, it wa s clear that th e U.S, France and th e U K (among o ther countri es) intended to
reco gni ze Koso vo 's ind ep en d en ce regardl ess (E co no m ist, 2007).
Kosovo UNILATERALLY DECLARES INDEPENDENCE
Kosovo unilaterally d eclared its ind ependen ce from Serbia on Feb ru ary 17 , 2008.
Wh ile the secessio n of a semi -a uto no m o us region from a state is not in itself uniqu e , th e
h isto ry behind Koso vo indep endence is, as wa s ex plained in th e prev io us sec tio n. P rotests
co nt in ue through out both Se rb ia and Kosovo as th e status q uestio n remains unresol ved .
The co nditio n o f human rights has d et eriorated as violence has spread throughout both
K oso vo and Serbia after K oso vos unilat eral decl arati on of indep endence . T he re ha ve been
several instan ces where Alba nia n m in orities ha ve been persecuted and attacked . Se rbs in
M erohjia ha ve also been persecuted and attacked b y Kosovars (C o m m ission o f the Europ ean
Communities 20(8) .
T he United States rec o gnized K oso vo' s ind ependen ce Fe bruary 18 , 2008 follo w ed
quickl y by th e United Kin gd om, Fran ce and G e rma n y, am ong o the rs. M an y European
co u ntries have already ere cted em bassies in Kos o vo an d hav e pledged signifi cant am ount o f
aid to help build this new "cou ntry ." K oso vo has enjoyed th e full support o f two thi rd s o f
all E U M ember Sta tes, th e U nite d States, C anada and other prominent inte rn ati onal figures.
D ur ing this time , Serbian Presid ent Boris Tad ic stated, "Se rbia w ill never reco gni ze
Koso vo-Mcrohij a' s ind ep en dence directl y o r indirectl y and wi ll co ntin ue its dipl omatic,
pe aceful and legal battle in defending its integrity" (Se rbian G ove rn m ent 2009). Serbia is
co m m itte d to o nly pursue peaceful m ean s in dealin g w ith th e Koso vo sta tu s q ue stio n . T his
has been made q ui te clear and, as o f yet, no military ac tio n has been tak en . R ather Se rbia
has attem pted to hling thi s case from pur ely politi cal to purel y legal through its pursuit o f an
IC] o pinio n on th e legality o f Kosov os ind ependen ce .
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LEGALITY
Ser bia feels that its territorial integritv and so vere ign ty we re violated wi th K osovos in-
de penden ce . Purrhermore, Se rb ia bel ieves th at the intern utional co mm unity lias no t treated
Ser bia as an eq ual in intemational law.
In Se pte m ber o f 2008 , Se rb ia tabled a U N Gene ral Assembly R esolution w ith th e
in tenti on to c hallenge th e ma tter o f K osovos inde pen de nce from po litica l to ICg:l1 gro unds
(D T T N ews, 9/ 2( 08). In October, th e UN Gen e ral Assem bly did ad o pt R esoluti on 63/ 3,
w hich see ks th e Int eruati onal C o urt o f justice 's o pinio n o n w he the r o r no t Koso vo"s uni-
lat eral declaration of ind ependence was in accordance w ith internati onal law. T he q ues tion
referred to the ICJ read s: " Is th e uni lateral declarati on o f independen ce by the Pro visio nal
Inst itution s o f Se lf-Cov errnue nt o f Kosovo in acco rda nce with interna tio nal law ?" (Vid m ar
2( 09). Aft er a ten se voting period m the UN GA, Se rbia 's resolution was passed thou gh
all EU co un tries abstaine d (VIP N e ws, 912008). This ICJ case w ill be difficult to deciphe r.
Kosovo IS an unprecedented case within itself; however, th ere are many clauses in inr er na-
tional custo mary law th at ca n be applied to det ennin ing th e legality o f Kosov os indepen -
den ce.
Ser bia maintains th at thi s action was a vio latio n of th e UN C harte r be cause it did not
respect the territorial integrity of Se rbia (V IP N ews, 9/2008) . Th e Un ited N ati ons was
founded on th e principle of so vereignty. C hapter I, Arti cle 2(1) o f th e United Nations
C ha rte r states th at , "The Organ izati on is based on the principl e o f th e so vereign equali ty
of all its M embers." Serb ia feel s that it is not be ing recognized as eq ual subj ect of interna-
tion al law w ith th e right o f territori al integrity . This co nce pt of so vereignt y is em phasize d
throu gh o ut th e charte r alo ng wi th int ernati onal custo mary law. In parti cular, UN Sec uri ty
C ouncil R esolution 1244 (which is th e document th at end ed th e Kosov o war of 1999 and
esta blished Koso vo) spec ifically call s o n th e international co uu n uuiry to recogn ize Serbia ' .I
terr itorial in tegri ty . In one of th e perambu latory clau ses in the resolution it states, " Reaf-
firming th e commitment of all Mem ber States to th e sovereignty and territorial int egrity
of the Federal R epublic o f Yu goslavia and th e o ther States of th e regio n, as set o ut in th e
H elsinki Final Act and annex 2. " It is clear th at th e international co mm unity had commit-
ted itself to respect the territorial integri ty o f Se rb ia; howe ver, it does not see m as th ough
till s is th e case .
The W est gene rally uph o lds th e values o f th e IC] and suppo rts its decisio ns . However,
in thi s case , th e lC] w ill no t cha nge th eir o pinio n and w ill con tinue to support Koso vo 's in -
dep endence. Ev en if th e ICJ does de cid e that Kosovos declaration o f indep enden ce was not
in accorda nce with internati o nal law , it is un likel y to undo what has been done . The situa-
tion cannot go bac k to th e fOIll1 er status quo. Kosov o w ill not go back to being a territo ry o f
Serbia. H o we ver, if th e ICJ rul es in favour of Se rbia, deeming K 0 50 VO'S declarati on of inde-
pendence illegal, it w ill di scredit Koso vo 's act ions. T he IC] opinio n poses a problem to th e
W est . This could sto p othe r co untries from rec ognizi ng Kosovo. Already, several countries
have refu sed to give an o pinion o n th e matt er until afte r th e IC] o pin io n is rele ased. In fact ,
pr esiden t Boris T udic in vited those "U N m embers that have not recognized th e provin ce's
indep enden ce to rem ain so until th e Internatio nal Cour t o f justice offers Its opinio n o n
th e legality of thi s sec ession " (Ser b ian G ov ernme nt 2009). Although Ser bia does not have
mu ch popular suppo rt d ue to W estern opposi tio n, it does have th e law on its side . It is cle ar
that Kosovos decl arati on of inde pe nd ence is qu estionable legall y. This puts th e W est in a
pr ecarious situatio n- how to ato ne for their lack of interve nt io n in the Bosnian C ivil War
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and illegal int er vention In 1999, and resol ve thi s co mplex issue of Kosovo 's ind ep enden ce )
WHAT CAN BE DONE Now?
Kosovos de claration of ind ep endence is an irreversible process. In total, fifty- six states
(as of March 2009) have recognized Kosovos ind ep endence, including the United States
and o ve r two thirds of E U Member States. Kosovos acceptance by such prominent int er-
nati on al act ors makes it impossibl e tor Kosov o to return to the formerl y autonomou s region
w ithin Se rbia. At th e same tim e, Serbia will ne ver let Koso vo become all independen t state .
The status question mu st be resolv ed, and as soon as possible. H owev er, neither side is will-
ing to secede to the wi shes of the o ther. Currently , th e United States and Europea n nations
have pursued settling th e Kosovo status question in th e sallie m ann er th at it has been since
1l)9l)-complete ind ep endence for Koso vo recogn ized by th e inte rnat io nal co mm uniry.
These co untries are pu shing Serbia to reco gni ze an independent Koso vo in disregard to the
Serbi an interests. Th e internationa l conuu un ity is left at a stalemate. This region is rife with
histori cal conflict and hostilities th at have been fostered for hundred s of years. The Kosovo
status issue cannot he easily resolved , especially if neither side offers co ncessio ns or cooper-
ates in negotiations.
The use of politi cal pre ssure to force Serbia to recogni ze Koso vo 's independen ce has
pu shed Serbia furth er fronl the W est and towards it s sympathizing neighbor Russia (Eco no-
mi st 2008). This co uld have dire co nsequences for th e future of th e Balkan regi on. The
rift between the East and West has already been gro wing during th e past few years and has
caused rela tio ns between the two to grow cold o nce agai n. Russia wa rned that thi s obvio us
breach in international custom ary law could de stabiliz e th e whol e European continent into
an other out break of Yu go slav wars. The Russians' con cerns are legitimate, and thus it is
em in ent that the W est change its plan o f action.
Serbia needs to rec ognize Kosov o in order to establish <lny kind of peace or sec urity
in th e reg io n . Serbia' s rec ognitio n o f an independent Ko sovo also legitimizes th e W est 's
acti on s and legitimizes Koso vo itself Simply forcin g Serbia to recogni ze ;111 ind ep endent
Koso vo is ob viou sly not workin g. R ath er, Serbia can he furth er enco ur aged to recognize
Kosovo ifKosovo were to be partition ed and to co nt inue Serbia 's integration into th e Eu-
ropean Union within th e next few years. These tw o major concession s could help to create
a pe aceful resolution to the Kosovo status question .
PARTITION OF Kosovo
Kosovo was created because th e regi on is populated by a different ethnicity th reatened
by th e ruling majority If this is a reason for granting independen ce for Kosovo, th en the
lines ought to be drawn in accordan ce to the erhuiciries. If bo rd ers are to be drawn for a
new co unt ry on th e basis of creariug nati on states, th en it seems prudent to keep th e nations
with in th e same state borders.
C u rren tly , Kosovo enco lllp,lsses territory both north and so uth o f the river Ib ar . The
northern part of K osovo, Mctohija, is predominantl y populated by Serbs not Alb anians.
The 10% Serb population in all of Kosovo reside s primaril y in Merohij a. One consideration
during th e status negoti at ions w as to split Kosovo and Metohija , keeping Merohija as part
o f Serbia.
Serbia has shown deep con cern for the Serb min ority in M eroh ij a, as was see n in the
deploym ent of th e Europ ean Union R.ule of Law Mi ssion III Ko sovo (EU LEX). Serbia has
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resisted th e depl o ym ent of EULEX. in order to get so m e form o f acceptance, the United
Nations and Eu ropean Union alt ered th e mi ssion ma nd ate in w hat is the " U N-Serbia Six -
Point Plan ." Serb ia w ill o n ly sup po rt ;1 mi ssion to Koso vo if it is 111 lint' wi th it s demands
regarding th e deploymeut o f E U LE X, nam ely: EULEX ha ving a neut ral stan ce on Kosovos
status , EU LEX must have no con nectio n w ith th e M arrti Ahti saari plan for Koso vo ind e-
penden ce and it only be deployed with the UN Secur ity C ouncil approval. The UN-Serbia
p lan calls for th e creatio n o f se parate Se rbian judicial custo m s and poli ce syste ms in th e
northern, Se rbian area of Kosovo (DT T News, 11 /2008) . Kosov o initially rejected th e
UN-Serbia Six- Po int plan . w hic h had been ap proved by th e UN Sec uriry Cou nc il (D T T
N ews, 12 / 2008). Koso vo w ishes for unconditional and full deployment of EULEX across
th e entire territo ry, sup po rt in g th e M artti Ahtisaari plan . They ,Irgue that ne w 6- Po in t plan
brea ch es K osovos sove re ign ty and territo rial integri ty and would lead to w ards partition
o f th e area (D T T N ews, 11/2008). Serbia does not look at th is as a pa rt itio n o f " Ko sovo "
because tllt' y d o not see it as ,1 partition o f Serbia , accord ing to Ser bian D eputy Prime
Minister M r. B o zida r DjeJi c (Dj elic . 200 8) . Prishtina has stated that it is una ccepta b le for
EULEX to be d epl o yed to Koso vo according to Serbia 's co nd itio ns. The EU ha s called o n
Kosovo leaders to ac cept th e plan, as has th e UN. K osovo fmall y gav e into the demands o f
th e int ernat ional co n u n un iry and EULEX began d epl o ym ent in D ecember of 2008 (D TT
N ews, 12 / 2008) .
D ur ing negotiation s from 2005- 2007, it w as pr oposed th at th e Koso vo border be re-
d raw n to exclude M erohij a: a proposition that Se rb ia seem ed interested 111. Kosovo refus ed
to entertain th e motion o f partit ion o n th e gr ounds that it w o u ld violat e th e ir territorial
integri ry. H o w e ver, if K oso vo is n ot fully recogni zed as an indep end ent co u nt ry , then it
does not seem to be in violation of territo rial integrity because both regi ons are in Se rbia.
It would see m to be in th e be st interest o f th e Serbs in M er ohij a to rem ain In Se rbia. Ad-
ditionally, it would seem ill Kosovo' s best interest as w ell becau se thi s co nc essio n mi ght help
its pursu it o f indep end en ce .
EU MEMBERSHIP
The co nflict ov er th e Kosov o qu estion has strained Serhian-EU relations an d has
pushed Ser bia furth er from th e West. This is not in th e int e rest o f th e EU . It is cr itical th at
Se rbia and th e EU be united in policy in o rder to bri ng stab ility to the Balkan regio n . The
EU needs Serbia not o nly to stabilize th e Ba lkans, but also to legitimize lllan y of th e EU
member sta tes ' suppo rt o f Kosovo . Enlargemen t o f th e EU is one o f th e EU's m ost po werful
policy tools, esp eciall y in ensuri ng security , stab ility and co nflict pr evention (C ommissio n
o f Eu ropean Conu n u niries, 20 07) . The allu re o f Eu ropean Uni on m embershi p is a po w e r-
ful in centi ve and th e EU ca n use it to th eir advanta ge to settle the Kosov o statu s qu estion.
The 1993 Eu ropean Cou nc il in Copenhagen d ecid ed up on a co re se t of criteria for
poten tial cand idate co u ntries that th e co u nt ry must fulfill befo re an y negotiations can start.
T he "Copen hagen Cri te ria" sta tes that a candidate co unt ry must have " stabl e in stitutions
th at guar.m ree democr.rcy. th e rule o f law , human rights and respect for and protection o f
min orities; a fu nctioning m arket eco nom y, as w e ll as th e abi lity to cope w ith th e pressure o f
courpe tirio ns and market forces ar work inside the Union ; th e ability to assum e the o bliga-
tions o f m embership. in parti cular adhere nce to th e obj ectives o f political , eco nomic an d
m onetary union " (E uro pea n Cou ncil in C o pe n hagen 1( 93). T wo yea rs later at th e M adrid
European C o unc il, these crite ria w ere clarified : that not onJ y will the co un tries need to
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show their willin gn ess to follow the criteria, out have th e capacity to put th e European
Union rules and pr o cedures into effect (European Co u ncil in Madrid 199 5). N ot on ly do es
th e government need to m ak e legislati on to m eet th ese c ri te ria, but be able to implemenr
and enfo rce new legislat ion th rough all e ffic ien t ad mi n istra tio n and judi ciary ,
These are th e cri teria th at Serb ia, JS w ith all o the r appli caur s, must fulfill to ha ve
o ffic ial candidacy status and even tually become a m em ber. Whil e it is important fo r Se rbia
to also fulfill requirements defi ned in the Co pen hagen and M adrid C riteria, it is eve n m o re
pressing that th e Koso vo statu s qu estion be an sw e red . Exp editing the accession pro cess o f
Serbia w ill bring Ser bia close r to the EU faster. As sta ted earlier, accession is primaril y ;1
political act, wh ether ex plic it or not. The EU sh ould use this political decision as levera ge
to further encourage Se rb ia to recognize Kosovos indep endence.
Serbia has clearl y ex pressed its wishes to become an E U member. and the E U shares
thi s view. In September o f2008 . Ser bia's parliament ratifi ed it s Stabilizatio n and Asso ciati on
Agr eement w ith th e EU , th e first ste p to wards m embership. Since th en , Serbia ha s worked
o n building and streng the ning relati ons with th e E U and th e W est in ge ne ral. The govern -
ment has expressed its goa l for Se rbia to have E U cand idacy in 2009 and accessio n by 20 15
(OTT New s, 200H) .
Serbia w ants to become an EU m ember: wi th me mbersh ip comes Incr edible o p-
po rtunity and prosperity , parti cularl y economically. Cou ntries become Int egrated into th e
common European m ark et th at ultimately strengthen s th e co unt ries' economi es. Serb ia has
ex p ressed its wish to ben efit from these opportuniti es th at th e EU presents. T he E U gives
stru ctu ral funds to h elp decrease th e difference in livin g stand ards in its poorer regi ons and
to b oost the economies o f th ese regi0IlS as w ell (E uro pa 20(9) . Se rb ia has o ne o f th e w ea ke r
econom ies in Eu rope, and would be n efit grea tly fro m EU integrati on (O T T N e ws 2(08) .
Se rb ia has alread y show n its d et ermination to en te r into th e European free mark et. Even
though the Dutch fro ze any furth er implementati on o f th e SAA, Serbia has im pleme nted
th e p ro visions o f th e Interim Ag ree me nt w ithou t th e help o f th e EU . This limited ac cess
alo ne w ill improve th e Serbia n market subsranriallv an d help crea te m acroeconomic stability
wi th in the region (E uropa 2009) . This has also allo w ed Ser b ia access into larger m ark et s,
including capital market s and has in creased trade, in vestment flows and foreign direct in-
vestm e nt. All of the potenti al o ppo rt u ni ties for Serbia's econom y to grow hav e pr ovided
sign ificant fiscal Incenti ve for Serbia 's decision to app ly for candidacy.
This is a powerful in centi ve and the EU can use it to th ei r advantage to se tt le th e
Koso vo status qu estion . Enla rgem ent of th e EU is o ne of th e EU 's most powerfu l poli cy
tools, espec ially in ensu ring se cu rity, stability and conflict pr evention (Co m m issio n o f En-
ro pe an Com m unities, 2007).
Granting a co untry " cand idacy status" for th e EU has alw ays been a polit ical decision .
This so ft po wer o f pote ntial EU membership has e ncouraged several countries to improv e
th eir gove rn m ent's every sp he re o f influen ce and civil society to confonn to EU poli cy .
Alth ough Serbia has signed and ra tified its Stabilizat ion and Association Agreements, it had
m ad e little progress towards m eeting the established ben chmarks. Currently, Se rb ia is not
read y for candidacy, ev en th ou gh the Serbian government inte nds to submit a formal pro -
posal for candidacy in April 2009 (Serb ian Government 200 9) .
CONCLUSIONS
600 years of foul re latio ns bet w een th e Serbs and Kosovars has made th e Koso vo status
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ques tio n ex tre mely complex and con troversial. The recent intervention s of NATO and the
U N pavIng the road for Kosovos indep enden ce has augm ent ed thi s con te ntio us con flict to
he one of th e most co ntrovers ial circ umstance s fK ing the int ern ational co nun u niry. Kosovo
is w ithout precedence ill th e new int ernational orde r go vemed by in te rnational customary
law and non-governmeur al organizati ons such as the UN and EU. Thus it is murky waters
in wh ich ~ ) JJ parties involved tread .
Int ern at ional custo mary law, uph eld by m ost every state o n th e glo be, is built o n the
standard of respect fo r ano ther state 's territo rial integrity and sove re ignty. Yet sim ultanc-
ously, th e right to self-d et ermination is also a highly valu ed concept as well. In th e case of
Koso vo and Serb ia, these two foundati onal concepts of int ernation al custo mary law are at
en ds. Up ho ld Serb ia's so vereignty , o r suppo rt Koso vos right to self-de te rn unat io u?
In 1991J the W est comm itted its support to self-determ inatio n and thu s Ko sovo. As
the West pursues its agenda, nam ely forcin g Ser bia to recogni ze Kosovo , Serbia and Serbian
sym pathizers grow mo re isolat ed and disgruntl ed by their actio ns. Q uite simply: it's not
goi ng to work.
Concessions need to be made o n both sides. The West de mands for Serbia to sacri fice
Kosovo, yet offers no sacrifi ce of th eir own . Kosovo means more to th e Serbs th an a piec e
of land. Th is is thei r nation's birthp lace- this is w here Serbia began . Kosovo is th e heart of
Ser bia. T o demand Ser bia to give that up is incredibl y ditficult . Whil e nothing can ato ne
for Serbia' s loss III th e Se rbs ' poi nt of view, the West needs to rect ify th is situatio n as best
as possible . Although it is too late to find a solution th at both parti es can agree to, some
co ncessio ns can still be made . Partitioning Kosovo to keep Metohij a in Se rbia and brInging
Serbia int o the EU fold can en courage Serbia to recognize Ko so vo and to start the peace
building p rocess bet ween the two co unt ries.
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